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SUPERFUND AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE
HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP: EXXON
CORPORATION v. HUNT
The growing concern over hazardous waste' has led many states and
the federal government to enact emergency response and cleanup stat-
utes.2 The sources of funding for these cleanup measures include taxes,
general revenues, fines, bond forfeitures, and recoveries from liable par-
1. American industry generates approximately 57 million tons of hazardous waste
annually. See Slap, Generator Liability for Hazardous Wastes, 5 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE
MATERIALS J. 95 (1981). There are between 32,000 and 50,000 hazardous waste sites
nationwide, Note, Superfund: Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental
Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 524, 525 (1981), and more than 90% of hazardous waste is
disposed of improperly. Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94
HARV. L. REv. 584 (1981).
Because of poor disposal and the shortage of safe disposal sites, one expert comments
that "practically the entire United States population is at risk of illness or injury." S.
REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980). See Note, The Preemptive Scope of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980: Ne-
cessity for An Active State Role, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 635, 638 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
Preemptive Scope].
The total cleanup bill for hazardous waste ranges from $10 billion to $40 billion.
Warren, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?,
13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,348 n.3 (1983) (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 6 (1983)).
2. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,352. Of the 36 states that have enacted such legisla-
tion, about eighteen passed their laws after CERCLA. See infra notes 6, 45. Other
states amended their statutes to complement the CERCLA legislation.
New Jersey, the country's largest generator of hazardous waste, is familiar with the
consequences of poor disposal. See Rollins Envtl. Services, Inc. v. Township of Logan,
199 N.J. Super. 70, 80, 488 A.2d 258, 263 (Law Div. 1984), rev'd, 209 N.J. Super. 556,
508 A.2d 271 (App. Div. 1986). In recent years, New Jersey's problems have included
the contamination of rivers from nearby landfills, the forced closing of private wells, and
the endangering of Atlantic City's principal source of drinking water. Id. While some
experts fear an explosion at a New Jersey dump site could produce a toxic cloud endan-
gering thousands of people in the New York metropolitan area, the state "is having
difficulty finding a safe disposal site for more than 40,000 barrels of hazardous wastes."
Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 638 n.25 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19-20 (1980)). In recent years, however, New Jersey has made
substantial strides to clean up its 300 hazardous waste sites. As of April 1981, the state
had expended more than $25 million from the Spill Fund on cleanup. Lesniak v.
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ties.3 The funds are then utilized in emergency situations and in reme-
dying general problems.4 The New Jersey Spill Compensation and
Control Act5 (Spill Fund or SCCA) is an example of one such state
statute. Under federal legislation known as the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund or
CERCLA),6 states are allowed to conduct fund raising and cleanup
activities to combat hazardous waste.' CERCLA also, however,
preempts state activities' and the extent of the preemption is not al-
ways clear.9 CERCLA and SCCA both utilize a front-end tax to cover
the costs of hazardous waste cleanup. 10 In Exxon Corporation v.
Hunt" the United States Supreme Court examined the language and
congressional intent of CERCLA's taxing provision and held that the
federal statute partially preempted New Jersey's front-end tax.12
United States, [13 Pend. Lit.] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,353 (D.N.J. Apr. 2,
1981) (petitioner's complaint).
3. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,353. Most states obtain funding through "back-end"
taxes. Thirty-five states use this method, taxing transporters or generators of hazardous
waste or owners and operators of disposal facilities. Some states vary the tax according
to the weight or volume, the type of waste, or the disposal method. Id.
4. Id. The author observes that states have a variety of solutions to hazardous waste
problems that will cause confusion for companies with facilities in more than one state.
Id. at 10,349.
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 to -23.llz (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
7. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351. The author states that CERCLA "expressly
saves certain types of state programs and expressly preempts others." Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). See infra note 16 for the full text of § 9614(c). CER-
CLA precludes states from "imposing additional financial responsibility beyond those
spelled out in § 108 of CERCLA and from allowing double recovery for claims compen-
sable under state law or the federal fund." Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351.
9. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. "[U]ncertainty pervades the issue
of preemption." Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 646.
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11o (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)
(1982). A front-end tax is an excise tax on manufacturers or importers of raw materials.
Warren, supra note 1, at 10,353. CERCLA § 211 amended the Internal Revenue Code
to add 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (1982), which imposes a tax on crude oil and petroleum prod-
ucts entering the United States, and to add 26 U.S.C. § 4661 (1982), which taxes specific
chemical feedstocks. Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 106 S. Ct.
1103 (1986) (No. 84-978) [hereinafter Brief for Appellants]. The Spill Fund taxes major
petroleum and chemical facilities on the transfer of hazardous substances or petroleum
products. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11h (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). See also Brief
for the United States as Amincus Curiae at 7, Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 106 S. Ct. 1103
(1986) (No. 84-978) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae].
11. 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986).
12. Id.
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New Jersey taxed both the state petroleum and chemical industries
pursuant to SCCA.Y3 The Exxon Corporation filed suit against New
Jersey, in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, 4 seeking reimbursement for taxes paid between the enactment
of CERCLA and the suit filing date. 5 Exxon argued that section
114(c)16 of CERCLA precluded New Jersey from taxing the company
because the state tax conflicted with the federal legislation. The district
13. The Taxation of Major Facilities section reads in pertinent part:
There is hereby levied upon each owner or operator of one or more major facilities
a tax to insure compensation for cleanup costs and damages associated with any
discharge of hazardous substances to be paid by the transferee.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 lh (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). The Spill Compensation
Fund section reads in pertinent part:
The New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund is hereby established as a nonlapsing,
revolving fund in the Department of the Treasury to carry out the purposes of this
act. The fund shall be credited with all taxes and penalties related to this act.
Interest received on moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10.23.1li (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). New Jersey enacted the
Spill Fund to provide a comprehensive program for the prevention, cleanup, and re-
moval of hazardous substances. New Jersey v. United States, [13 Pend. Lit.] Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65,694 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 1981) (petitioner's complaint).
14. [13 Pend. Lit.] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65,695 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 683
F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983).
15. Id. at 65,695 (petitioner's complaint point 3). Exxon sought a refund of
$750,000 that it had paid to the Spill Fund between December 3, 1980 (the date of
CERCLA's enactment) and May 12, 1981 (the date of filing). Id. Compare this refund
with the estimate for 1982 that the American petrochemical industry lost $350 to $400
million to sources such as Spill Fund and Superfund. DiNal & Kovall, The Superfund
Blues: CERCLA Reauthorization and A New Proposal for Funding, 13 A.B.A. BRIEF
29, 31 (1984).
16. Section 114(b) reads in pertinent part:
Recovery under other State or Federal law of compensation for removal costs of dam-
ages, or payment of claims
Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims
pursuant to this chapter shall be precluded from recovering compensation for the
same removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal
law. Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or
claims pursuant to any other Federal or State law shall be precluded from receiving
compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims as provided in this
chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 964(b) (1982). Section 114(c) reads in pertinent part:
Contributions to other funds:
Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to
any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of
response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter.
Nothing in this section shall preclude any State from using general revenues for
such a fund, or from imposing a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance
in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response
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court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds. 7 Exxon 8 subse-
quently brought suit in the New Jersey Tax Court. 9 The Tax Court
granted the state's motion for summary judgment, z° holding that CER-
CLA did not preempt the Spill Fund.2' The New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division,2" and the New Jersey Supreme Court af-
firmed the Tax Court's decision.2" The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction,24 and subsequently affirmed in part and
reversed in part. 5
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides
that any laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Con-
gress ... are invalid."216 Thus, under this "check on state power," '2 7
equipment or other preparation for the response to a release of hazardous sub-
stances which affects such State.
42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982).
17. 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,886 (1981). The Tax Injunction Act pro-
vides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy, or
collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be
had in the courts of such state." 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The court found that the
New Jersey Tax Court provided a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. Exxon, 11 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,887.
18. Exxon's co-plaintiffs were B.F. Goodrich Co., Union Carbide Corp., Monsanto
Co., and Tenneco Chemicals, Inc.
19. 4 N.J. Tax 294 (1982).
20. Id. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Exxon argued that the state tax
compensated hazardous waste sites that the Superfund might ultimately compensate.
New Jersey argued that the Spill Fund, as a supplement to Superfund, provided com-
pensation for claims not receiving Superfund coverage. 97 N.J. 526, 529, 481 A.2d 271,
272 (1984).
21. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 4 N.J. Tax 294 (1982).
22. 190 N.J. Super. 131, 462 A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1983). Before the superior court
rendered its decision, Exxon appealed its reimbursement suit to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision.
683 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1982). Exxon then petitioned for certiorari in October of 1982.
N.J. St. Tax Rep. (CCH) para. 201-002. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 459
U.S. 1104 (1983).
23. 97 N.J. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (1984).
24. 105 S. Ct. 3474 (1985). On December 17, 1984, Exxon filed an appeal with the
United States Supreme Court. 53 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1984) (No. 84-978).
The Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United
States. 105 S. Ct. 1353 (1985). See High Court Notes Probable Jurisdiction in
"Superfund" Case, N.J. St. Tax Rep. (CCH) Report Letter No. 423 (July 8, 1985).
25. 106 S. Ct. 1103, 1109 (1986).
26. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)). During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
made it clear that "[a] law violating a constitution established by the people themselves,
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state law yields to federal law if a conflict between the two exists.2 8
State law is preempted if it hinders a strong federal legislative
purpose.2 9
Although the Court's preemption standards vary3" when it applies
the Supremacy Clause 31 and Congress has not explicitly preempted the
field, the Court exhibits a preference for state regulatory power.3 2 In
would be considered by the Judges as null and void." THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 309 (G. Hunt & J.B. Scott eds. 1920) (Session of Monday,
July 23, 1787). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 126 (J. Madison) (R.P. Fairfield
2d ed. 1966).
27. See Comment, State Power and Preemption in the Nuclear Energy Field: Pacific
Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion, 26 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 139, 141 (1984).
28. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (due to the Atomic Energy Commission's exclusive author-
ity over the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, state efforts to regulate
radioactive releases are precluded); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978)
(state law is void when in direct conflict with federal legislation, but state regulations
stand when the Secretary of Transportation has not promulgated regulations); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (state laws that are less stringent or require
different information expressly preempted by federal statutory language and purpose);
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (the pervasive
nature of the federal regulatory scheme preempts state and local control). See also Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (state law preempted if Congress ex-
pressly provides federal law is exclusive authority in a particular field). See generally
Note, Superfund and California's Implementation: Potential Conflict, 19 CAL. W.L.
REV. 373, 389-90 (1983).
29. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (federal statutory scheme preempted
state alien registration law). Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (preemption
if federal interests are so pervasive and dominant that Congress left no room for state
regulation).
30. Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified
Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1978). Compare Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (when Congress intended active
state involvement, a strong state policy that does not conflict with federal laws will
prevail) with Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (even though Congress
did not foreclose the field, a state statute is void if it conflicts with similar federal legisla-
tion) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (a state statute must fall if it ob-
structs federal objectives and purposes).
31. Comment, supra note 27, at 146.
32. Id. at 145. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Con-
servation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (Congress preserved a dual system of
regulation under which state regulations are not preempted because the federal govern-
ment regulates safety and the state regulates traditional economic concerns such as gen-
erating capacity); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(federal inspection laws do not preempt the state's power to promote local health and
Washington University Open Scholarship
248 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:243
New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino,33 for in-
stance, the plaintiffs, New York public assistance recipients, were sub-
ject to New York's conditions for aid.34 The plaintiffs argued that the
Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) preempted New York's statu-
tory scheme. 35 The Court reasoned that because the state program co-
ordinates and complements the federal program the preemption
argument is less persuasive.36
The ability of state and federal legislation to coexist in a given area is
illustrated in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Ware.37
The case involved a state law that protected employees from post-em-
ployment forfeiture clauses. 38 The Court held that a New York Stock
Exchange rule allowing such clauses did not preempt the state law and
emphasized that courts should favor the reconciliation of state and fed-
eral schemes.39
Although the federal government is involved in environmental regu-
lation,' ° Congress has not completely preempted the field.4 In fact,
many federal environmental programs are executed with the states' co-
operation." Under these circumstances, Dublino and Ware suggest
that states are free to regulate areas such as hazardous waste cleanup
cleanliness). See also Comment, Environmental Law: A Reevaluation of Federal Pre-
emption and the Commerce Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 649 (1979).
33. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
34. Id. at 422-23.
35. Id. at 411. Dublino involved the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN)
amendment of 1967 to the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1982). Under WIN,
employable aid recipients were to register with the state for manpower services, train-
ing, and employment as a condition of assistance. New York had a similar requirement
for state granted aid. 413 U.S. at 407 n.1.
36. 413 U.S. at 421. The Court held that Congress did not intend to preempt state
work programs, but remanded for a determination of whether specific provisions of
New York's law conflicted with the Social Security Act. Id. at 422-23.
37. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
38. In particular, the statute invalidated employment contracts that restrained a
person from engaging in a related post-employment business. Id. at 121.
39. Id. at 127.
40. Comment, supra note 30, at 208-10.
41. Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351. "[U]nlike other environmental legislation that
has been held to preempt state laws, CERCLA expressly preserves them." Id.
42. Id. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982), relies on state and local cooperation with the federal gov-
ernment. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1982), requires
cooperative efforts for the prevention and control of air pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a).
The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982), provides
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and removal.43
To regulate waste production, Congress enacted the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).4 Because RCRA, how-
ever, did not adequately deal with the problems of hazardous waste,
45
Congress enacted CERCLA to amend RCRA.46 CERCLA created a
trust fund to finance joint state-federal cleanup operations.47 Congress
funded the 1.6 billion dollar fund through taxes imposed on both the
petrochemical and oil industries and from general appropriations.48 In
spite of criticism of its poor construction and confusing language,49 the
federal financial incentives to states in order to develop programs preserving coastal
areas.
43. Note, supra note 28, at 390-95.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). RCRA "established a 'cradle to grave' regula-
tory system" for hazardous waste. Note, Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rlv. 265, 308
(1982).
45. Note, supra note 28, at 3768 n.23. The Act was prospective and did not deal
with the cleanup of older sites. Another reason further legislation was necessary was
the EPA's lax enforcement of RCRA. Id.
46. IA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 4A.04[1]-[2], at 4A-105
to -150 (1985). Superfund is "logically connected and continuous with the regulation of
hazardous waste disposal sites under Subtitle C of RCRA." Id. Congress enacted
CERCLA after considering more than twenty bills on the subject. Note, Preemptive
Scope, supra note 1, at 643. Senate Bill 1480 reported out of the Senate Committee on
Finance on November 18, 1980. IA F. GRAD, supra, at 4A-126 to -127. Before the
Senate considered Senate Bill 1480 on November 24, 1980, a bipartisan group of sena-
tors quickly negotiated and wrote an entirely new bill. Id. at 4A-136 to -137. The bill
passed in the Senate and, under a suspension of the rules that barred any amendments,
was introduced as an amendment to House Resolution 7020 and passed with limited
debate. Id. at 4A-123. Because of the method in which this bill passed, Superfund "has
virtually no legislative history at all." See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1109 (D.N.J. 1983). See also Annotation, Governmental Recovery of Cost of Hazardous
Waste Removal Under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 70 A.L.R. FED. 329 (1984), for a general discussion of CERCLA.
47. Note, supra note 28, at 374. This is a "cost sharing scheme requiring state par-
ticipation." The Superfund provides "liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency
response for hazardous substances released into the environment" and the cleanup of
inactive waste disposal sites. Id.
48. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661 (1982). See Warren, supra note 1, at 10,350. Of this
amount, $1.38 billion came from "taxes on crude oil, certain petroleum products, and
42 chemical feedstocks with the remainder coming from appropriations." Id.
49. IA F. GRAD, supra note 46, at 4A-150. Some of the confusion derives from
CERCLA's reliance on and cross-reference to other laws. Id. at 4A-106. Opponents
pointed out that the bill was flawed and contained many "substantive defects." Con-
gressman Broyhill gave Congress a "three-page list of various defects and technical er-
rors." 126 CONG. REC. H31,969 (1980). Courts reviewing the legislative history to
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legislation passed into law.
Although CERCLA preempts certain state activities,5 ° it expressly
requires states to pay at least ten percent of the expenditures"1 for joint
operations. Section 114(c) specifies the uses to which a state can apply
its taxes under CERCLA's scheme.5 2 In determining whether a federal
statute preempts a state statutory scheme, courts typically apply the
ordinary meaning of the statute's language, assuming that it expresses
legislative intent.5 3 CERCLA's statutory language suggests broad fed-
eral preemption. 4 Section 114(c) states that "no person may be re-
quired to contribute to any fund. . . which may be compensated under
this subehapter., 55 The Act fails to indicate, however, how to inter-
pret the phrase "may be compensated."56 Whether compensation is
discretionary under the ordinary meaning of the phrase or mandatory
under a narrower interpretation 57 turns on the legislative intent, 8 the
discover congressional intent have commented that the legislative history is "unusually
riddled [with] self-serving and contradictory statements," United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983), and both the statute itself and its legislative history
are vague. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa.
1982). Congress also did not provide a committee report clarifying the scope of the
legislation. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
50. Note, supra note 44, at 310. Butsee Warren, supra note 1, at 10,351. "The only
apparent limitation on state programs in the federal Act is preemption of certain state
hazardous waste cleanup tax-financed funds... ." Id.
51. IA F. GRAD, supra note 46, § 4A-109. CERCLA also requires the states to pay
for subsequent maintenance of the targeted site. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(A)
(1982).
52. Note, supra note 28, at 383. Statements during debate indicated that CERCLA
complements other environmental laws, 126 CONG. REc. S30,993 (1980) (remarks of
Senator Randolph), that preemption of state funds occurs only when the Superfund
actually pays for the operations, 126 CONG. REc. S14,981 (1980) (dialogue between
Senator Randolph and Senator Bradley), and that states could impose a tax to pay for
the states' initial response costs. 126 CONG. REc. S14,981 (1980) (remarks of Senator
Randolph).
53. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2388 (1985). The
Court also noted it must presume Congress "did not intend to preempt areas of tradi-
tional state regulation." Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)). But see Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (when a
federal statute unambiguously forbids certain types of state actions, the courts "need
not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state
statute ... is pre-empted").
54. Note, supra note 28, at 388-89 n.122. "The language of the federal act is
broader than the legislative intent to prevent double taxation." Id.
55. See supra note 16.
56. Note, supra note 44, at 321.
57. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 662-63
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statutory context, 59 and the subject matter 6° of the dispute.
In an attempt to clarify the ambiguity of section 114(c), New Jersey
initiated two suits against the federal government.61 In New Jersey v.
United States62 the court noted that the federal government "genuinely
took no position" on whether CERCLA preempted state law.63 Les-
niak v. United States" was also part of New Jersey's effort to prove
that CERCLA did not preempt the state taxing provision.65 This suit
(1923); Kraft v. Board of Educ., 247 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (D.C.C. 1965), cert denied, 386
U.S. 958 (1967) (interpretation based on the legislative intent as shown by the statute
and legislative history). If, however, "may" and "shall" appear in the same sentence, or
the words are close juxtaposition in different places of the same statute, the courts apply
the words' ordinary meaning. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1944) (the
use of "may" and "shall" in the same sentence implies the purposeful use of each);
United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Co., 175 F. Supp. 678, 682 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (citing
Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Hansen, 113 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1940)) (the general
rule is that "may" is permissive and grants discretion, especially when juxtaposed with
"shall"). In Jensen v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 255 F. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), Judge
Learned Hand analyzed the use of "may" and "shall" in the first and third paragraphs
of the statute. He stated that "may" sometimes means "shall," but "hardly when the
two words are in such immediate contrast." Id. at 796.
58. Kraft, 247 F. Supp. at 24-25. New Jersey argued that according to the legisla-
tive history, the phrase "may be compensated" strictly limits federal preemption of state
taxation to items under Superfund coverage. Thus, the state can use Spill Fund monies
when Superfund financing is inadequate or unavailable. Brief for Appellees at 9-11,
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986) (No. 84-978) [hereinafter Brief for Appel-
lees]. Exxon argued that the plain meaning of "may be compensated" means eligibility
for compensation and not actual payment. Brief for Appellants, supra note 10, at 24.
Exxon also argued that CERCLA's legislative history supports this interpretation. Id.
at 40-41 (Senator Magnuson's formulation of "may be compensated" prohibited dupli-
cative funds).
59. United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401
U.S. 996 (1971).
60. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 262 U.S. at 662.
61. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
62. In New Jersey v. United States, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1846 (D.D.C. 1981),
the state sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that CERCLA did not preempt the taxing and funding provisions
of the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act.
63. [12 Curt. Dev.] Env't Rep. (BNA) 933 (Nov. 27, 1981). The court dismissed
the complaint as not ripe for review, stating that New Jersey is not "in apprehension of
imminent federal action threatening its program." Id.
64. Lesniak v. United States, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1455 (D.N.J. 1982). A
New Jersey state legislator brought this suit. [12 Curr. Dev.] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1393
(Mar. 5, 1982).
65. Lesniak v. United States, [13 Pend. Lit.] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 65,695
(D.N.J. Apr. 2, 1981) (petitioner's complaint). The plaintiff sought a ruling that CER-
CLA violates the United States Constitution or, in the alternative, a declaratory judg-
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ended when the Environmental Protection Agency agreed that CER-
CLA did not preclude New Jersey from using the state's Spill Fund to
respond to hazardous wastes. 66 These two suits constituted New
Jersey's attempts to clarify existing law so that the state could effi-
ciently operate its cleanup and removal programs.6
7
In Exxon Corporation v. Hunt 61 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the New Jersey Supreme Court decision 69 and reversed in
part the New Jersey Tax Court's grant of summary judgment.70 The
Tax Court relied on Superfund's legislative history as well as its scope
and purpose71 to conclude that "even if § 114(c) of [Superfund] is con-
strued to preempt part of the [S]piU [F]und, the... nonpreempted
areas are more than sufficient to sustain the Fund's continued
validity."
72
The Court noted that because Exxon was an express preemption
case,73 the Court need only look to the statutory language to determine
the extent of federal preemption. 4 The Court acknowledged but re-
jected the Solicitor General's amicus curiae reading of the phrase
"costs of response or damages or claims."' 75 The majority found sup-
ment interpreting § 144(c) narrowly. Plaintiff stated the "ambiguity of § 114(c)
[whether it is interpreted broadly or narrowly] has created confusion.. . and has ren-
dered immobile legislative efforts to refine, improve, and expand efforts to clean up
chemical dumps within the state." Id.
66. [12 Curr. Dev.] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1393. The settlement allows New Jersey
to use its tax funds for all expenditures not actually compensated by CERCLA. War-
ren, supra note 1, at 10,352.
67. Id. at 10,352. See supra note 65.
68. 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986).
69. 97 N.J. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (1984).
70. 106 S. Ct. at 1109.
71. 97 N.J. at 529, 481 A.2d at 272.
72. Id. at 530, 481 A.2d at 273 (quoting 4 N.J. Tax 294, 320 (1982)). The Tax
Court would also have upheld the tax scheme "because the statute contained an express
severability clause." Warren, supra note 1, at 10,352. "The court found it could, there-
fore, sever uses of the fund that potentially duplicated CERCLA but uphold the tax
scheme itself." Id.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1119 (citing Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12
(1983)). See supra note 53.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 1109. The New Jersey Supreme Court argued that "[a]lthough it
may be true that many of the purposes to which Superfund moneys are put overlap with
the purposes of Spill Fund, this fact alone does not require a conclusion of preemption."
97 N.J. at 536, 481 A.2d at 276.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 1111. The Court analyzed the Solicitor General's opinion because
its logical force helped in understanding Exxon's and New Jersey's arguments. Id. The
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port for its rejection of the narrow amicus interpretation of the pre-
emption provision in CERCLA's legislative history,7 6 the wording of
section 114(b),77 and the saving provision of section 114(c).7" Upon
comparing section 114(b) with section 114(c)7 9 the Court noted that
the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling made the first sentence of sec-
tion 114(c) redundant ° and violated the plain meaning of the phrase
"may be compensated.""1 Rejecting New Jersey's argument that sec-
tion 114(c) applies only when Superfund pays a claim or would have
paid a claim, 2 the Court stated that New Jersey failed to consider
other congressional policy choices,83 distorted the "language and
logic" of section 114(c),14 and lacked sufficient support for its view in
CERCLA's spare legislative history.8
Solicitor General argued that Superfund preempts only one of the five uses of Spill Fund
monies (i.e., the payment of other parties' damages and cleanup costs) and may preempt
the entire tax on non-severability grounds. 106 S. Ct. at 1110-13. See Amicus Curiae,
supra note 10, at 20. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1lo(2),-23.llq (West 1982).
The Solicitor General further argued that § 114(c) prohibits funds that "pay compensa-
tion for claims of any costs of response or damages ... [or] claims which may be
compensated under [the] subchapter." Amicus Curiae, supra note 10, at 16. The Solici-
tor General interpreted "claim" narrowly as a private party's demand for reimburse-
ment for cleanup expenses from a state fund or Superfund. 106 S. Ct. at 1110.
76. Id. at 1111-12. The Court examined the similarities between § 110 of H.R. 85
and § 114(c) and determined that congressional intent regarding pre-emption did not
change when § 114(c) became law. Id.
77. Id. at 1112-13. See supra note 16.
78. 106 S. Ct. at 1113. The saving provision, or the second sentence of § 114(c),
allows the state to impose a tax "to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous
substance response equipment" or otherwise prepare for the release of hazardous sub-
stances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982). The Court concluded that the Solicitor General's
interpretation made the saving provision redundant. 106 S. Ct. at 1113.
79. Id. The Court made this comparison in order to determine the meaning of
§ 114(c)'s phrase "which may be compensated under this subchapter." Id.
80. Id. By reading "may be compensated" to mean "is compensated," § 114(c) be-
came redundant because Congress banned double compensation under § 114(b). Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1114-15.
83. Id. at 1114. Congress was also concerned, the court stated, with the adverse
effects of overtaxation on the petrochemical industry. Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 172,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1979); DiNal & Kovall, supra note 15 for a general
discussion of congressional policy choices.
84. 106 S. Ct. at 1114.
85. Id. at 1115. Although the debate between Senators Bradley and Randolph, see
126 CONG. REc. S30,949 (1980), supports New Jersey's stance, the majority, because of
ambiguities, inaccuracies, and the truncated consideration of the bill, declined to give
the statements much weight. 106 S. Ct. at 1115. See supra notes 49-52. The New
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Finally, the Court defined the category of expenses that "may be
compensated" by Superfund8 6 and compared this category with the
Spill Fund scheme in order to determine the extent of federal preemp-
tion.87 According to the Court, the National Contingency Plan
(NCP)88 provides criteria such as the annual National Priorities List89
for determining what expenses at which sites are eligible for federal
money.9" Although the Court did not accept Exxon's total preemption
argument,9" it held that section 114(c) preempted Spill Fund expendi-
tures beyond the required ten percent state contribution 92 for both
costs incurred to remedy sites on the National Priorities List93 and re-
moval costs eligible for compensation under NCP criteria.94  Justice
Stevens dissented,95 concluding inter alia that the New Jersey tax was
not subject to federal preemption because the Spill Fund had purposes
Jersey Supreme Court also relied on various statements made by Congressman Ran-
dolph, particularly his remark that the language of § 144(c) "is a prohibition against
double taxation for the same purposes.... In summary, ... this preemption provision
is narrow in scope and limited to the particular purpose of preventing double taxation."
126 CONG. RiEc. S30,993 (1980). See also Brief for Appellees, supra note 58, at 19.
New Jersey argued that the presumption against preemption is particularly strong when
a traditional function of state government, such as taxing, is involved. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2389-90 (1985); Brief for Appellees,
supra note 58, at 19.
86. 106 S. Ct. at 1115-16.
87. Id. at 1116.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(A), (B) (1982). The National Contingency Plan (NCP)
"delineates appropriate federal, state, and local responsibilities and encourages state au-
thorities to undertake response actions." Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 650.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) (1982). The NCP list includes about 400 high priority
facilities as determined by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1986).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1115-16. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.65 (1986) (Superfund will finance
removal or immediate cleanup only in emergency situations); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(a)
(1986) (sites listed on the National Priorities List are exclusively eligible for remedial
financing); 50 Fed. Reg. 9593 (1985) (Environmental Protection Agency criteria for
using Superfund monies for national resource claims).
91. 106S. Ct. at 1116. See also Brief for Appellants, supra note 10, at 19-20. Exxon
argued that because states cannot duplicate Superfund uses, they cannot duplicate
Superfund taxes, thus invalidating the New Jersey tax. Id. Total preemption, however,
would render the "may be compensated under this subchapter" language meaningless.
106 S. Ct. at 1116.
92. Id. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 106 S. Ct. at 1117-21.
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other than compensating valid claims made against the Superfund. 96
New Jersey's response to federal inaction in the cleanup of hazard-
ous waste97 was to continue its own taxing and cleanup efforts. 98
Although CERCLA requires active state involvement in the Superfund
legislative scheme,9 9 the preemption issue turns on whether section
114(c) is narrowly or broadly interpreted.1 °" A broad reading of the
preemption provision discourages state efforts to clean up and control
hazardous wastes °" and severely limits a state's ability to raise needed
funds for the cleanup and removal of toxic wastes. 10 2 On the other
hand, a narrow interpretation of the preemption provision flouts con-
gressional policies and intent and violates the plain meaning of "may
be compensated."'0 3 The Court's compromise between Exxon's total
preemption standard and New Jersey's "all or nothing" preemption
standard" invalidates particular parts of New Jersey's taxing
scheme'0 5 yet leaves the severability issue to the New Jersey courts.'0 6
Although the Court recognized that both houses of Congress had
96. Id. at 1118. Justice Stevens also argued that Congress knew of the New Jersey
Spill Fund if Congress had intended to preempt the Spill Fund it would have done so in
less ambiguous language. Id. at 1119.
97. Chamberlain, Superfund Cleanup A Question of Pace, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Aug. 31, 1985, at 3B. As of August 31, 1985, the EPA had cleaned only ten sites. Id.
See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 2.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3)(C), (d)(1) (1982).
100. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
101. Note, Preemptive Scope, supra note 1, at 655. A narrow reading encourages
more state involvement and "provide[s] states with greater flexibility in meeting their
matching grant and other obligations under CERCLA." Warren, supra note 1, at
10,352. "Courts should not impede these state efforts [to clean up hazardous waste] by
an overly broad interpretation of CERCLA's preemption clause." Note, supra note 44,
at 337.
102. Id. at 320. The preemption provision "casts doubt on the status of these state
programs [taxes, fines, or fees on generators or disposal facilities]." Id. This puts states
in a "double bind." The states "may not be permitted to raise funds such as under the
New Jersey Spill Act. Yet they are required to contribute ten percent.... As a result,
states may not receive the monies necessary to clean up and abate a hazardous waste
spill." Note, supra note 28, at 388 n.121.
103. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. See also 97 N.J. at 536, 481
A.2d at 276.
105. 106 S. Ct. at 1116. See supra note 36. See also New York State Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
106. 106 S. Ct. at 1116.
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recently passed bills repealing section 114(c),1"7 it did not address the
Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of that section.10 8
The EPA's position is that section 114(c) does not apply to state spend-
ing that the Superfund could, but does not, reimburse. 0 9 Congres-
sional committees have also interpreted section 114(c) narrowly." 0
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on CERCLA's legislative his-
tory to support a narrow reading of section 114(c), and interpreted
"may" to mean "shall.""' The Court, however, dismissed the legisla-
tive history as ambiguous and inaccurate" 2 and properly interpreted
the phrase "may be compensated."'' 13
New Jersey was the only state using a front-end tax to finance haz-
ardous waste cleanup measures."' The Court invalidated this scheme
because of the preempted expenditures' 15 and articulated a preemption
standard that utilizes National Contingency Plan criteria." 6 As a re-
107. Id. at 1109 n.6 (citing S. 51, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) and H.R. 2817, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), inserted into H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). Earlier,
the Senate defeated the Superfund reauthorization bill, H.R. 5640. Congress in 1984: A
Mixed Bag, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,449, 10,450 (1984). "Senate Republi-
cans advocated waiting until 1985 to reauthorize the Act." Id. at 10,451. The
Superfund expired on September 30, 1985. Chamberlain, supra note 97. As of the end
of June, 1984, Congress had not yet reauthorized Superfund. Washington Wire, Wall
St. J., June 27, 1986, at 1.
108. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY & REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE: COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS
WITH STATES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPEN-
SATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, Pun. L. No. 96-510, ix-x (Mar. 1982).
109. Id. See also 97 N.J. at 541, 481 A.2d at 279.
110. Id. at 540, 481 A.2d at 279. The Committee on Energy and Commerce stated
its belief that "the proper interpretation of current law is that its preemption provision
was intended only to preclude states from imposing taxes or otherwise requiring contri-
butions to funds which would be actually compensated by Superfund." Id. Citing
views of a later Congress, however, is a dangerous basis for inferring prior intent. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117 (1980). See also
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
111. 97 N.J. at 534-39, 481 A.2d at 275-78.
112. 106 S. Ct. at 1115. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
113. Jensen v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 255 F. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). See supra note 57
and accompanying text. "May" and "shall" are both used in § 114(c). See supra note
16. Each word should carry its proper meaning, especially when the two words appear
in the same statute.
114. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 87-94, 106 and accompanying texts.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(A), (B) (1982). See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying
text. This criteria gives states a certain degree of flexibility because of their ability to
recommend priority sites within the state. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B) (1982).
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suit, the Court's holding reduces the potential financial burden on the
petrochemical and petroleum industries' 17 and is in step with congres-
sional policy to save domestic jobs and help these industries remain
competitive with imports. 18
Gary E. Cooke, II
117. Chamberlain, supra note 97. Currently, only twelve corporations pay almost
70% of Superfund taxes. Environmental Protection Agency data on materials found at
549 National Priority List sites, which showed the petroleum refining industry identifi-
able at only 5% of these sites, demonstrates that the industry burden is already out of
proportion with liability. DiNal & Kovall, supra note 15, at 31.
118. See supra note 83.
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